> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.primestaking.xyz/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.primestaking.xyz/security/audits-1.md).

# Audits

## Security Audits

All PrimeStaking smart contracts undergo independent external audits before deployment and whenever significant updates are introduced.

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### Methodology

1. **Reputable external auditor** - We partner with leading firms (e.g., QuillAudits) that review every line of code and validate the economic logic of the contracts.
2. **Two-phase process**
   * *Preliminary report:* Identification of findings.
   * *Fix & Verify:* The engineering team resolves issues and the auditor performs final verification.
3. **Transparent disclosure** - Full reports are published so the community can verify the scope and applied fixes.

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### Published Reports

| Module                                                                                                                                 | Auditor             | Findings                                                                                           | Link                                                                                                                               |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| [**XDC Staking Contract (V1 / liquid staking)**](https://www.quillaudits.com/leaderboard/prime-numbers/prime-numbers-staking-contract) | QuillAudits         | 98.8% score                                                                                        | [Report](https://www.quillaudits.com/leaderboard/prime-numbers/prime-numbers-staking-contract)                                     |
| **psXDC V3 vault + V3 Migration Bridge** (NM-0843)                                                                                     | Nethermind Security | 1 Critical · 2 High · 1 Medium · 6 Low · 9 Info · 2 Best Practices (**18 Fixed / 3 Acknowledged**) | [Report (PDF)](https://github.com/PrimeNumbersLabs/primestaking-gitbook/tree/main/NM_0843_xdc_prime_stake_FINAL_updated_tests.pdf) |

{% embed url="<https://www.quillaudits.com/leaderboard/prime-numbers/prime-numbers-staking-contract>" %}

> Our target is to keep every audit score **>= 95%** and close findings of Medium severity or higher within **72 hours**.

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### Nethermind Security: NM-0843, XDC Prime Stake (May 08, 2026)

**Scope (1,391 LoC):**

* `PrimeStakedXDC_V3.sol`: ERC-4626 native-XDC vault, non-upgradeable, with the buffer / FIFO queue / `claimQueuedAssets` flow, masternode round-robin auto-propose, delayed governance, role split, and per-report / per-day loss caps.
* `PrimeStakedXDC_V3MigrationBridge.sol`: V2 psXDC → V3 share migration with `minSharesOut` slippage protection, time-locked excess withdrawals, daily withdrawal cap, and delayed owner transfer.

**Process:** initial review (commit `f92b803`, March 26, 2026) → fix verification → final commit `2d97d9b` (May 08, 2026). Documentation Assessment: Medium. Test Suite Assessment: Medium.

**Findings, by severity and status:**

| Severity       | Count  | Fixed  | Acknowledged |
| -------------- | ------ | ------ | ------------ |
| Critical       | 1      | 1      | 0            |
| High           | 2      | 2      | 0            |
| Medium         | 1      | 1      | 0            |
| Low            | 6      | 5      | 1            |
| Informational  | 9      | 8      | 1            |
| Best Practices | 2      | 2      | 0            |
| **Total**      | **21** | **18** | **3**        |

**Acknowledged findings (no functional fix shipped):**

| Finding                                                                            | Severity | Why acknowledged                                                                                                                        |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Users can frontrun `reportValidatorLoss(...)` to evade slashing penalties          | Info     | Mitigated operationally via the per-report and per-day loss caps; routing all exits through the queue would degrade UX.                 |
| Constructor does not enforce a non-zero seed at deployment                         | Low      | Operational pre-deployment requirement; the deployment script seeds the vault.                                                          |
| `redeemWithQueue` / `withdrawWithQueue` use all-or-nothing logic (no partial fill) | Info     | Two-call pattern (`redeem(maxRedeem)` + `redeemWithQueue(rest)`) gives the same outcome; partial fill considered for a future revision. |

**All Critical, High, and Medium findings are Fixed.** Highlights:

* *Critical*: returned masternode stakes were double-counted in `trackedTotalAssets`; resolved by routing principal returns through `resignMasternode(...)` instead of the unprivileged `receive()` path.
* *High*: receivers could trigger a gas-bomb in `_processWithdrawalQueueInternal(...)` to brick the queue; resolved by enforcing a strict gas limit on the external call.
* *High*: permissionless `syncTrackedAssets()` during migration could let early migrators steal funded liquidity; resolved by gating `syncTrackedAssets` with `whenMigrationFinished`.
* *Medium*: deferred queued payouts were not ring-fenced from the protocol's accounting; resolved by introducing a `totalDeferredPayouts` accumulator and excluding it from `_availableForImmediateWithdrawal`, `_availableForQueuePayout`, and `_syncTrackedAssetsExcludingInflow`.

The full per-finding write-up, recommendations, and per-fix verification is in the [PDF report](https://github.com/PrimeNumbersLabs/primestaking-gitbook/tree/main/NM_0843_xdc_prime_stake_FINAL_updated_tests.pdf).

***

### V3.1 redeployment (July 2026)

The live vault, [`PrimeStakedXDC_V3_2`](https://xdcscan.com/address/0xDc74c0DaED82ae94486DeeF22991d2F54173c734), is a redeployment of the NM-0843-audited V3 codebase with a scoped set of changes to support the staged masternode-collateral transition: an under-backed launch mode with NAV write-down protection, ring-fenced funding lanes for the withdrawal queue, and the one-time `V31AirdropDistributor` mint path used to mirror V3 balances. The V3 architecture, roles, time-locks, and withdrawal design are otherwise unchanged. **A follow-up external audit of the V3.1 delta is in progress and will be published on this page.**

***

### Other V3 stack components

The XDC NFT V3 surface (`XdcStakedNFT`, `XdcNftStakingVault`, `XdcNftMigrator`, `XdcNftBoostHarvester`, `LegacyMigratorBypassFacet`) ships with an internal 46-test suite plus a 17-test audit-fix regression battery covering every C/H/M finding from the internal review. External audit of this surface is planned and any future report will be published on this page.

***

**Note:** The core PRFI Token contract was fully audited. Although not part of this staking documentation, the report is publicly available.